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 Abstract 
Economists explain welfare dependency of the unemployed and in-work 
poverty by the low labour market quality of the poor. Work can be made to pay 
by working family tax credits. But these might lower wages and price non-
recipients out of the market, widening the eligibility for the wage 
supplementation and raising social welfare bills. This was precisely the effect of 
the Speenhamland system of wage supplementation of the early 19
th Century 
which permanently affected labour markets, and attitudes to welfare and the 
poor. The possibility of working family tax credit having a similar effect cannot 
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  2THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF WAGE SUBSIDISATION: 
SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The view in government circles is that the economy has now been 
bought under control by prudent macroeconomic management. A 
major remaining problem is the high level of poverty resulting from 
the persistence of high unemployment and the growth in the number 
of the working poor. The policy response to this is to make the 
payment of social welfare dependent on labour market participation 
by a variety of means, including topping up earnings to some 
minimum level by means of tax credits. The idea of in-work benefits 
as an answer to unemployment and in-work poverty has its roots in 
the belief that it is unemployability at the wages demanded by workers 
rather than unemployment that explains joblessness; and that it is poor 
labour quality combined with family size which explains in-work 
poverty rather than exploitation. Attaching benefits to work, it is 
asserted, makes the offer of jobs affordable to employers while 
making work pay for prospective employees. This helps break the 
cycle of welfare dependency by creating greater incentives for the 
poor to work by making up the difference between their household 
needs and the market valuation of their capabilities. 
 
In-work-benefits had been out of policy favour between 1834, when 
the Poor Law Reform put an end to the Speenhamland System which 
similarly mixed wages and welfare benefits, and 1971, when Family 
Income Supplement was introduced as an anti-poverty measure. Their 
policy importance increased as unemployment grew after 1979 and 
when, in 1988, Family Income Supplement was replaced by Family 
Credit (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1991). Attaching welfare benefits to 
labour market participation has since become a central focus of the 
current Labour Government’s welfare to work strategy. The more 
generous Working Family Tax Credits has been substituted for 
Family Credit, and the plans are to extend eligibility to include 
households without children. There is now such a strong consensus in 
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work poverty that any discussion of its drawbacks or of alternatives is 
muted.  
 
The consequences of going further down the road towards a general 
in-work benefit strategy are sufficiently uncertain to warrant a public 
discussion about all the possible issues involved. This paper is a 
contribution to this debate. Its purpose is to assess present-day policy 
from the point of view of historical experiences of, and arguments 
about, wage subsidisation, the lessons of which are being, 
unaccountably, forgotten. The second section briefly re-examines the 
debates surrounding the Speenhamland system of wages subsidisation 
and how it impacted on poverty and the working of the labour market. 
Sections 3 to 6 chart changes in labour market theorising and how 
these relate to the ebb and flow of unemployment and poverty, and 
their social and political consequences. Section 7 outlines 
contemporary arguments in favour of wages subsidisation. Section 8 
outlines an alternative perspective on the labour market and how that 
might be used in the teaching of the lessons of history, and for 
designing effective labour market and social welfare policies. 
 
2. The Speenhamland System: an experiment in wage 
supplementation 
 
i. The pauperisation of the poor in the Eighteenth Century 
During the Eighteenth Century the enclosure of land, its consolidation 
into large holdings, the elimination of small-scale farming, the 
exclusion of the poor from common land, the loss of customary rights, 
and the decline of domestic industry had a major impact on the 
structure and working of labour markets. The loss of land and 
customary rights increased wage dependency. The decline in the 
traditional paternalistic employment relations and the move to arable 
farming, with greater seasonal variation in labour demand, increased 
job insecurity. Alternative employment, and particularly that of 
women, disappeared with the loss of domestic industry, customary 
rights (eg. gleaning), and access to common land and the wastes. 
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increased unemployment and under-employment, and generally 
impoverished a growing proportion of the working population. The 
burden of this growing poverty fell upon the local poor rate, a local 
tax levied on property holders, out of which Parish Relief was paid to 
the destitute under the provisions of Elizabethan Poor Law legislation. 
This, together with Statute of Artificers, provided a legal framework 
for the labour market which imposed a duty to work on the poor 
(backed up by draconian anti-vagrancy laws), a responsibility on the 
parish to find work for the unemployed and a right to subsistence for 
the impotent poor (the widows, orphans, sick and aged). Despite 
legislative and less formal attempts to enforce the duty to work, either 
in workhouses or by public works, the main burden of the burgeoning 
poverty in the second half of the 18
th Century fell on outdoor relief 
(Slack, 1988, de Schweinitz, 1961, and Geremek, 1994).  
 
The Poor Law was administered by the parish officials under the 
supervision of the Justices of the Peace. Entitlement to Parish Relief 
was regulated by the Settlement Laws which provided access to social 
welfare only in the parish in which individuals were settled.  The 
Settlement Laws, which were increasingly strictly interpreted with the 
growth of rural poverty (Deakin, 2001), impeded labour market 
mobility beyond the immediate locality. This protected parishes from 
pauper migrations and secured the supply of labour for the local 
employers but, by geographically segmenting labour markets, closed 
off possible escape routes for the unemployed and those who were 
trapped in low paid employment.  
 
An important way by which settlement was achieved was by annual 
hiring. But this fell out of favour both because of the risk of further 
burdening the local tax payers, and because the increasingly important 
arable farming required a more flexible workforce to meet the 
seasonal pattern of its labour demand. This growing gulf between the 
interests of capitalist farmers and their landless labourers further 
eroded the traditional paternalist employment relations and added to 
job and income insecurity, a tendency accelerated by the Napoleonic 
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casualisation, the Poor Law became increasingly a means of 
supporting able-bodied workers laid-off by their employers who 
‘hired as little and as briefly as he could, relying on the parish to 
maintain the unemployed’ (Hobsbawm and Rude, 1993, p.72). 
 
ii. The emergence of Speenhamland 
The effects of labour market restructuring on poverty levels was 
exacerbated in the 1790s by high and rising prices resulting from a 
series of poor harvests and the Napoleonic War inflation. Various 
solutions were proposed to relieve the distress of the poor, including 
dietary changes towards cheaper food, the provision of allotments to 
restore to the poor a degree of pre-market self sufficiency, a minimum 
wage to insulate wages against rising prices, and wage subsidies 
(Hammond and Hammond, 1947). Dietary changes proved 
impractical and the value of land was rising too rapidly for it to be re-
parcelled out, so the main debate centred around the imposition of a 
minimum wage (which the Justices could fix under then existing 
legislation) and the extension of Parish Relief to those in private 
employment. In 1795, Whitbread unsuccessfully introduced a Bill 
into parliament to re-activate the obligation of the Justices to protect 
living standards by fixing minimum wages. In opposing the bill, Pitt 
argued in favour of the free market for labour and against the legal 
minimum wage. He added: 
 
‘By the regulation proposed, either the man with a small 
family would have too much wages or the man with a 
large family who had done most service to his country 
would have too little. So that were the minimum fixed 
upon the standard of the large family, it might operate as 
an encouragement to idleness on one part of the 
community; and if it were fixed on the standard of a small 
family, those would not enjoy the benefit of it for whom it 
was intended. What measure then could be found to supply 
the deficit? Let us, said he, make relief, in cases where 
there are a number of children, a matter of right, and an 
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This will make a large family a blessing, and not a curse; 
and thus will draw a proper line of distinction between 
those who are able to provide for themselves by their 
labour, and those who after having enriched their country 
with a number of children, have a claim upon its assistance 
for support’ (Quoted in Schweinitz, 1961, p.73). 
 
In this speech Pitt recognised that the benefits of children ultimately 
extended beyond their immediate family and marshalled arguments 
which have a familiar modern ring: the market determination of 
wages, ineffectiveness of the minimum wage for relieving poverty, 
the rights of individuals (and especially families) to social welfare, the 
importance of targeting social welfare and its possible disincentive 
effects. 
 
The Speenhamland System of wage supplementation emerged from 
the debate over alternative ways of relieving poverty. The meeting at 
the Pelican Inn, Speenhamland on 6
th May, 1795 was originally 
convened to fix a minimum wage after concern had been expressed at 
the General Quarter Sessions about the ‘miserable state of the 
labourers and the necessity of increasing their wages to subsistence 
level, instead of leaving them to resort to the parish officer for support 
for their families’ (Hammond and Hammond, 1947, p.138). However, 
the resolution proposing a minimum wage was not carried and what 
emerged from the meeting was, in modern parlance, a minimum 
income guarantee linked to the price of bread by a sliding scale. Thus, 
‘when the gallon loaf of second flour, weighing 8lbs. 11oz. shall cost 
1 shilling, then every poor and industrious man shall have for his own 
support 3s weekly, either produced by his own or his family’s labour 
or an allowance from the poor rates, and for the support of his wife 
and every other of his family 1s 6d. When the gallon loaf shall cost 1s 
4d, then every poor and industrious man shall have 4s weekly for his 
own, and 1s 10d for the support of every other of his family’ 
(Hammond and Hammond, 1947, pp. 159-160). Thus, the minimum 
weekly income was to rise or fall by 3d. for the man and 1d. for every 
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price of a gallon loaf of bread, and any difference between this level 
and the weekly wage was to met from parish funds. The 
Speenhamland System was buttressed later in 1795 by an enabling 
amendment to the Poor Law which permitted His Majesty’s justices 
to order relief ‘to any industrious poor person or persons; and he, she, 
or they shall be entitled to ask and to receive such relief at his, her or 
their homes’ (Hammond and Hammond, 1947 p.73).  
 
Of the Speenhamland system Polanyi (1957) wrote: 
‘No measure was ever more universally popular. Parents 
were free of the care of their children, and children were 
no more dependant on their parents; employers could 
reduce wages at will and labourers were safe from hunger 
whether they were busy or slack; humanitarians applauded 
the measure as an act of mercy even though not of justice 
and the selfish consoled themselves with the thought that 
though it was merciful at least it was not liberal; and even 
the ratepayers were slow to realise what would happen to 
the rates which proclaimed the ‘right to live’ whether a 
man earned a living wage or not’ (pp.79-80).  
 
ii. Speenhamland in operation 
The Napoleonic War boom lasted until 1815 and as long as prices 
kept up, the full implications of Speenhamland remained hidden. The 
incomes of the poor were insulated from rising prices by the 
Speenhamland allowance, but this also served to keep wages down by 
checking demands for their increase. Therefore, although the working 
poor were to a degree protected against rising prices by the 
Speenhamland system, they failed to share in general prosperity 
which enriched those in receipt of profits, rent and tithes: capitalists, 
landlords and the Church of England parsons respectively. The ending 
of the war bought deep recession, with rapidly rising unemployment 
and falling prices and profits, although poor harvests kept food prices 
high. It was then that the full potential of Speenhamland for 
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Rude, 1993, Chapter 4).  
 
In the Speenhamland era there were four ways by which able-bodied 
workers were aided outside the workhouse: the allowance in relief of 
wages (supplementation of wages by parish relief), the roundsman 
system, the labour rate and public works. Allowance in relief of 
wages was the application of the Speenhamland principal to those 
already in employment, and the other three applied to the unemployed 
who looked to the parish for help. The roundsman system included 
various ways whereby the parish provided workers to local employers 
and made up the difference between what the employer paid and a 
minimum income. An unemployed person could be sent round by the 
overseers to the households in the village to seek employment at 
terms which were supplemented from the rates. In other places, the 
parish acted as labour only contractors for whatever price they could 
get and the participants were paid out of the rates. Elsewhere, the 
hiring rate (and hence the make-up to the minimum income from the 
rates) was fixed at auction. The labour rate located the responsibility 
for creating work directly with the employers. The parish set the rate 
and parcelled out the unemployed to employers who were required 
either to find them jobs or pay higher taxes. Public works was a 
relatively rare means of creating employment. In 1832 barely 5% of 
relief expenditures was accounted for by make-work schemes, 
including road work and that in the workhouses (de Schweinitz, 1961, 
p.75). 
 
An immediate effect of the Speenhamland System was to put upward 
pressure on the number on outdoor relief by throwing subsidised 
workers into competition with independent labourers, and forcing the 
latter onto parish relief. Workers with small amounts of property were 
also discriminated against. The administrative rules of the Poor Law 
made property owners ineligible for support so that those with only 
scraps of land could get neither relief nor compete for work with 
those in receipt of the Speenhamland allowance. The pressure was 
then on for them to qualify for relief by selling what they had. By 
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this drove wages down. A Committee on the Agricultural Wages, 
chaired by Lord John Russell, reported in 1824 that wages in the 
North, where Speenhamland had not taken full hold, were 
substantially higher than in the South where wage supplementation 
was widespread (Hammond and Hammond, 1947, pp. 180-181).  
 
Under the pressure of the widening coverage of in-work benefits, the 
related fall in wages and the resulting growing burden on the rates, the 
conditions for receipt of Parish Relief was continuously made more 
degrading, and allowances were reduced (Hobsbawn and Rude, 1993, 
Chapter 4). By 1830 the value of the minimum weekly income 
guarantee for a family of four had fallen to five gallon loaves from the 
seven and a half guaranteed by Speenhamland (Hammond and 
Hammond, 1947 pp.181-182
1). The cumulative processes of falling 
wages and cuts in parish relief increasingly humiliated the labouring 
poor and condemned them to abject poverty, a plight from which they 
were powerless to escape. This, together with their loss of 
independence, was destructive of motivation, ambition and 
productivity.  
 
The effect of the fall in wages was therefore to transform the wage 
supplementation into a direct subsidy to employers. They also became 
dependent on Parish Relief to make up the difference between what 
they paid their workers and what the latter needed to live on. Any 
employer that failed to take advantage of this subsidy was put at a 
competitive disadvantage in the product market, in much the same 
way that independent workers were in the labour market. However, 
any advantage of cheap labour to the employer was offset, at least in 
part, by the increased local poor rate they had to pay. This net 
advantage varied between employers to a degree determined by the 
rateable value of their properties compared with the size of their 
workforce. It therefore tended to favour large scale producers with 
many employees and discriminate against those who relied on their 
own and their family’s labour. These advantages were increased by 
the political power exercised in the parishes by the large employers 
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administrators who could turn the levying of the rate, the provision of 
relief and the allocation of the labour of the parish poor to their own 
and their friends’ advantage.  
 
For the workforce, and especially the rural workforce in arable 
farming areas, pauperism, degradation, desperation and discontent 
were universal and this fed the rise in crime and social unrest. From 
1810 economic crimes, especially poaching, rose continuously except 
in years of better harvests when the plight of the poor was temporarily 
eased. Machine breaking and arson were more sporadic and coincided 
with times of deep distress, reaching a peak in the 1831 and 1832 with 
the rise in social unrest associated with the Swing riots (Hobsbawn 
and Rude, 1993).  
 
The rising wave of crime and social unrest was met by increasingly 
Draconian responses in what can be regarded as a social arms race. 
As the plight of the poor worsened they resorted to more desperate 
means, to which the law responded by ever more savage measures. 
This reflected the feeling in governing circles that economic and 
social degradation had eroded the deterrent effects of judicial 
punishment. A view ‘founded on the belief that as human 
wretchedness was increasing, there was a sort of law of Malthus, by 
which human endurance tended to outgrow the resources of 
repression’ (Hammond and Hammond, Vol.I, 1947, p. 201). 
 
There is general agreement that Speenhamland had the effect of 
economically and socially degrading the poor and adding to their 
increasing exclusion by widening the social distance between the 
haves and the have-nots. This was quite the opposite to its original 
intention: 
The Speenhamland law which had sheltered rural England, 
and thereby the labouring population in general, from the 
full force of the market mechanism was eating into the 
marrow of society. By the time of its repeal huge masses 
of the labouring population resembled more the spectres 
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workers were physically dehumanised, the ruling classes 
were morally degraded. The traditional unity of a Christian 
society was giving place to a denial of responsibility on 
the part of the well-to-do for the conditions of their 
fellows. The Two Nations were taking shape. To the 
bewilderment of thinking minds, un-heard of wealth 
turned out to be inseparable from unheard-of poverty. 
Scholars proclaimed in unison that a science had been 
discovered which put the laws governing man’s world 
beyond any doubt. It was at the behest of these laws that 
compassion was removed from the hearts, and a stoic 
determination to renounce human solidarity in the name of 
the greatest happiness for the greatest number gained the 
dignity of a secular religion (Polanyi, 1957, p102). 
 
 
3. Political economy, politics, policy and the 1834 Poor Law 
Reforms 
 
The assault on the Speenhamland System came from political 
economists who theorised that it breached the natural laws of supply 
and demand. There were two sides to classical political economy’s 
labour supply side theory and its explanation of poverty. From the late 
17
th Century, poverty was regarded by many European writers as a 
stick needed to get from the growing population of labourers the work 
necessary to make wealth productive (Geremek, 1994).
2 However, the 
pauperisation of the later 18
th Century spawned an alternative theory, 
popularised by Townsend and systematised by Malthus. This had it 
that poverty resulted from population growth, driven by a lack of 
moral restraint on the part of the poor, pressing on the food supply. 
Food supply grew less rapidly than population because of the 
diminishing marginal productivity of land so ultimately starvation 
kept the labour supply in check. It was further supposed that the 
demand for labour was constrained by the wage fund - a fixed part of 
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that if employment was to rise wages would need to fall.  
 
Therefore, according to classical political economy, what determined 
the well being of the mass of the population was the natural fertility of 
the soil, the willingness of the poor to work, their propensity to breed, 
the rate of accumulation of the capital and the fixed wage fund. These 
operated though supply and demand for labour determining the level 
of wages and employment.
3 Any attempt to interfere with these 
natural  laws by, for example, attempting to alleviate poverty is 
countered by increasing population which absorbs any surplus and 
generalises the poverty. The fixing of a minimum wage above that 
determined by supply and demand reduces employment because the 
wage fund is fixed. Countering the resulting unemployment by job 
creation out of taxation (forced saving from the rich which effectively 
increased the wage fund) would only increase population and, if 
persisted in, ‘taxation for the support of the poor would engross the 
whole income of the country; the payers and the receivers would be 
melted down into one mass’ (Mill, 1909, p.364).  
 
The Speenhamland system
4, Mill argued, provided a wage subsidy at 
the expense of parish rate payers and this resulted in the system’s 
generalisation. By providing families with higher benefits than single 
people it offered a direct incentive to breed. But in addition to this, it 
was just another way of fixing a minimum wage ‘however numerous 
they (the workers) may be’ and it removed ‘positive and prudential 
obstacles to an unlimited increase’ (p.367). And, argued Mill, it had 
an additional absurdity; it reduced the wages paid by the employer by 
what it added in wages supplementation. The labourers, Mill argued, 
were habituated to living on the pre-allowance wage so that the effect 
of the allowance was to ‘people down’ (p.368) the wages paid by 
employers by increasing the supply of labour (through increasing the 
population or by mobilising surplus population trapped in 
workhouses). These labour supply effects were so strong that the 
wage plus allowance fell to below the wage level prior to 
Speenhamland. Mill summed up: ‘When the labourer depends solely 
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rate which will enable the population to be kept up, depopulation at 
least restores them to the lowest rate. But if the deficiency is to be 
made up by a forced contribution from all who have anything to give, 
wages may fall below starvation point; they may fall almost to zero’ 
P.368.
5 Mill concluded ‘All subsidies in aid of wages enable the 
labourer to do with less remuneration, and ultimately bring down the 
price of labour by the full amount, unless a change can be wrought in 
the ideas and requirements of the labouring class; an alteration in the 
relative values which they set upon the gratification of their instincts, 
and upon the increase of their comforts and the comforts of those 
connected with them’ (p.369). 
  
The natural laws of labour supply and demand resonated with the 
rising middle classes. The idea that poverty was caused by the poor 
and that relieving it threatened progress allowed a comforting sense of 
moral outrage and denial of responsibility. To the politician and 
administrator, ‘laissez faire’ ensured law and order at a minimum cost 
and effort. ‘Let the market be given charge of the poor, and things 
will look after themselves’ (Polanyi, 1957, p117). Further, the idea 
that how things turned out depended on the degree of restraint 
exercised by the poor allowed the shifting of responsibility to those 
denied any political power.  
 
The theories of classical political economy were quickly put into 
policy practice after the 1832 constitutional reforms had bought the 
middle classes to power. The work of the Poor Law Commission was 
directed by classical political economy and its findings were tailored 
to justify this theory’s predictions. The Commission’s report ‘placed 
the burden of destitution upon the shoulders of the individual. Poverty 
was regarded as essentially an indicator of moral fault in the person 
requiring relief. He was held very little short of exclusively 
responsible for his condition’ (de Schweinitz, 1961, p126). These 
findings were rushed into law. The 1834 Poor Law Act abolished 
wage subsidies but stopped short of abolishing all social welfare. 
Rather, a right to subsistence was retained but was ‘only made 
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lowest paid person in the labour market and on conditions which were 
so restraining and humiliating as to be tolerable only to those in the 
most desperate need’ (ibid). In effect, the poor lost any right to 




4. The refutation of the Classical ‘iron law’ of wages and the 
reconstruction of labour market theory 
 
Classical political economy united Malthus’ population theory, 
notions of the natural  indolence of the poor, Ricardo’s theory of 
diminishing marginal productivity of land and the wage fund theory 
into what were conceived as natural and immutable laws of labour 
supply and demand which condemned the mass of the population to 
abject poverty. However events progressively weaken the empirical 
foundations of these laws and cast growing doubt on the ‘Iron Law’ 
of wages. The scourge of famine was lifted by technical progress in 
food production and transport which opened up new fertile land for 
cultivation. With this increased supply of food its price fell, real 
incomes rose but the predicted population explosion did not happen 
because family sizes fell. The decisive nail in the ‘Iron Law’s’ 
demand side came with the refutation of the wage fund theory in the 
1860s, which showed that the idea of an invariable fund for the 
payment of wages to be a nonsense. 
 
The wage fund theory had constituted a powerful propaganda tool 
against wage fixing by law or by trade unions. ‘On the authority of 
that doctrine, employers and their political spokesmen could argue 
that trade union action was not simply economic nonsense, but that it 
ran against the true interest of an ill-advised and ignorant workforce’ 
(Biagini, 1987). Its refutation lifted the political economy objection to 
institutional wage determination and this played a part in the 
campaign by trade unions and their middle class supporters which 
eased many of the legal constraints on trade union activities in the 
1870s. But this relief for working class organisation from the 
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wage fund theory and the threat posed by Marx’s exploitation theory 
of distribution
7 triggered the development, in the 1880s, of the neo-
classical theory of wages.  
 
This extended Ricardo’s theory of diminishing marginal productivity 
of land to labour. But, whereas Ricardo’s theory was based on the 
natural variability of the fertility of land, the restraint on the 
productivity of labour is technical. The increase in the employment of 
equally productive labour relative to the amount of capital causes the 
output per head to fall. If then, employers are to employ more labour 
profitably, wages must fall in proportion to the fall in labour 
productivity. This reconstitution of the demand for labour theory 
reinstated the primacy of the market in determining wages and 
employment. If the market is free there is no possibility of capitalist 
exploitation because excess profits will be competed away. At the 
same time, any worker can enter the market provided they are 
prepared to accept a wage equivalent to their marginal product. By 
this theoretical rejigging the central role of the market in ensuring the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number was reinstated.  
 
The advantage of marginal productivity theory to economic 
orthodoxy is clear. It disposes of the thorny problem of income 
distribution between competing claimants by linking it to their 
contribution. However, it has little or no empirical support. In fact, 
“the pro-cyclical pattern of productivity movements has been solidly 
established in dozens of empirical studies” (Okun, 1981, p16), 
precisely the opposite to what is predicted by diminishing marginal 
productivity theory. This revealed tendency for labour productivity to 
rise as output and employment increases is readily explained by the 
fact that the level of efficiency of the operation of plant and 
machinery is higher the closer it is to technically and organisationally 
determined full capacity of operation. Any increase in output beyond 
full capacity requires investment in new equipment which can be 
expected to incorporate the latest techniques. This embodied technical 
change further enhances productivity and is more likely to come into 
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evidence implies, that there are increasing rather than diminishing 
returns to labour input so that the idea that wages must necessarily fall 
if employment falls, because of diminishing marginal productivity 
theory, has no more credibility than the wage fund doctrine. 
Nevertheless, despite this fatal weaknesses, neo-classical wage theory 
has retained its place as the orthodox explanation for how the labour 
market works.  
 
This reconstitution of wage theory rehabilitated the conclusions of the 
wage fund theory, that wages need to fall if employment is to rise, 
with one major difference. Wages were now directly linked to the 
productivity of labour, which determines what employers can pay, 
and which declines as employment grows. Any institutional 
impediment to the downward movement of wages to this level creates 
unemployment as does any social welfare benefit which provides a 
credible alternative to wage income. Marginal productivity theory 
therefore under-scored the principle of less eligibility in the 
administration of social welfare and put laissez faire on a more 
‘scientific’ basis. Unemployment and poverty could once again be 
blamed on trade unions, misguided charity givers, wrong-headed 
protective legislation and especially the poor and unemployed 
themselves.  
 
This reassertion of key beliefs gave renewed vigour to the central idea 
of Victorian social policy that the solution to poverty depended on the 
individual effort of the poor. Their need was to follow the example of 
liberal economic man who ‘is remarkable for his foresight and self-
control’. But ‘in the residuum (the mass of really poor families) these 
qualities are entirely absent’ (Mrs Bosanquet, quoted in Briggs, 1961, 
p.21). The salvation of the poor therefore, required them to be ‘turned 
into “liberal economic man”, and once they were converted they 
would, of course, cease to be poor’ (Briggs, 1961, p21).  
 
The notion that the poor were responsible for their own plight was 
challenged by the research of Booth and, especially Rowntree, who 
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the population of York could not reach even the lowest possible 
subsistence level. This refutation of Malthusianism opened the way to 
the development of economic theories supportive of Rowntree’s 
recommended solution to poverty: high wages, full employment and 
social security (Briggs, 1961)  
 
5. The Keynesian revolution, involuntary unemployment and 
social citizenship  
 
The high levels of unemployment and poverty of the inter-war years 
cast increasing doubt on laissez faire and laid the foundation for a 
revolution in economic theory which was carried into policy practice 
by the social accord engendered by the Second World War. This 
ushered in a commitment by governments to full employment and the 
welfare state. This policy revolution was based on the Keynesian 
notion that unemployment is caused by too low effective demand, 
which can be countered by government intervention, supported by a 
political belief in social citizenship: that having a job, decent health 
provision, a good education and social protection is the right of all 
(Marshall, 1992). 
 
Supported by the grand accord, Post-World War II Keynesianism 
combined progressive taxation with benefits designed to provide a 
minimum social wage. This served to reduce income inequalities and 
to prevent the marginalisation of those on low incomes. This 
redistributive tax-benefit system helped to underpin aggregate 
demand in the economy, and hence the achievement of full 
employment and higher economic growth. This, in turn, widened job 
opportunities and led to progressive labour market upgrading, 
especially amongst those hitherto deprived. (Tarling and Wilkinson, 
1997). It was therefore not coincidental that the golden period of 
Keynesianism, from around 1950 to the early 1970s, witnessed 
historically high rates of economic growth and declining income 
disparities. However, the golden age of social citizenship underpinned 
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and rising unemployment in the second half of the 1970s.  
 
6. The neo-classical counter reformation and the return to mass 
poverty 
 
The response of the economic orthodoxy to this crisis was the 
abandonment of the core Keynesian belief that without intervention 
labour market could not be relied upon to guarantee full employment. 
This retreat to neo-liberalism rehabilitated marginal productivity 
theory of wages and its central proposition that if employment is to 
rise real wages (money wages deflated by product prices) need to fall. 
Unemployment, the neo-liberals reasserted, results from trade union 
wage pressure and restrictive practices, government labour market 
regulation and too high social welfare benefits. These labour market 
imperfections create a natural, non-zero level of unemployment and 
any attempt to lower it below this level merely crowds out existing 
employment or adds inflationary pressure. The state’s contribution to 
full employment is therefore confined to prudent macro-economic 
management, deregulation to eliminate labour market imperfections 
and parsimony in the provision of out-of-work benefits 
 
Neo-liberalism, which was progressively adopted as policy from the 
mid-1970s onward, predicts that monetary control will contain 
inflation, and that labour market deregulation combined with 
regressive tax and benefit reform will secure full employment. The 
expectation is that the more unequal redistribution of income and the 
freeing up of markets will dramatically improve economic 
performance, and that the benefits of this higher rate of growth will 
trickle down the income distribution, benefiting everyone. But, 
although the conditions for this renaissance were created, by cuts in 
the relative pay of the lowest paid, extensive deregulation of labour 
markets, the weakening of trade unions, cuts in of welfare benefits and 
reforms to make them more conditional on active job search, the 
promised improvements have failed to materialise (Wilkinson, 2000). 
Unemployment has remained high and relative poverty has increased 
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increasingly unregulated firms have eaten into the number of jobs in the 
middle range of incomes and therefore the job prospects of workers 
trapped in poorly paid jobs or in unemployment. The polarisation of 
economic opportunities has been exacerbated by the growth of jobs at 
both extremes of the earnings distribution. Meanwhile, productivity 
growth has slowed, the balance of payments on the current account 
has progressively worsened despite the benefits of North Sea oil, real 
interest rates have been forced up as borrowing abroad has been used 
to prevent a collapse of sterling, and manufacturing investment has 
shrunk as a proportion of GDP.  
 
Despite these policy failures, the confidence that policy makers and 
their economic advisors have in the monetary control of inflation and 
market deregulation to improve economic performance has not 
wavered. Rather, the growth of poverty is explained by a deterioration 
in the quality and motivation of the poor because of the deskilling 
effects of unemployment, obsolescence of traditional skills, low levels 
of education, limited work experience and so on.  
 
7. The case for wage subsidisation and wage supplements 
 
Neo-classical theory of the labour market has two core beliefs. Firstly, 
that left to itself the market will establish equitable pay and conditions 
of work in the sense that they will reflect the quality and quantity of the 
labour input of individuals. Secondly, providing workers are prepared 
to accept the wage on offer, and meet employers’ skill and effort 
requirements, anyone can get a job who wants one. The wide 
dispersion of wages, some of which may be insufficient to sustain a 
reasonable standard of life, is a demonstration, neo-classical 
economists would argue, of how widely dispersed are individual 
capabilities (Hirsch and Addison, 1986). They attribute unemployment 
to a reluctance to work, unemployability because of poor labour 
quality, trades union bargaining and legally imposed minimum wages 
which raise wages above the market clearing level, labour market 
regulation which adds to labour costs and social welfare benefits 
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participation. 
 
These core beliefs underlie the arguments for wage subsidisation. 
Labour market imperfection (social welfare benefits and institutional 
barriers to wage reductions) combined with poor skills and motivation 
has, it is argued opened a gap between the supply price of labour, 
based on the income needs of the poor, and the demand price of 
labour, based on their low marginal productivity. A longer-term 
solution may be to raise productivity by education and training, and to 
inculcate an improved work ethics. But a shorter term solution is to 
either pay a wage supplement to workers to bridge the gap between 
their income needs and their marginal productivity, or a wage subsidy 
to employers to lower the cost of wages demanded to the level of the 
marginal productivity of perspective employees.  
 
Even if marginal productivity theory were a valid explanation of the 
determinants of employers’ demand for labour, unless wage subsidies 
are carefully targeted at supply side imperfections they may introduce 
imperfections of their own. For example, if low pay results from a 
demand side imperfection (e.g. monopsony [employer buyer power]), 
a wage subsidy/wage supplement will compound the imperfections by 
further lowering the price of labour below its marginal productivity. 
In this case, the appropriate action is to raise wages by establishing 
minimum a wage or the encouragement of the countervailing power 
of trade unions. Moreover, if unemployment is involuntary, 
subsidisation risks merely replacing those currently in employment 
rather than creating new job opportunities. Serious doubts can 
therefore be entertained about the validity of the neo-classical case for 
wage subsidisation. There is clearly no overwhelming theoretical 
reason for supposing that high levels of unemployment and in-work 
poverty can be readily countered by topping-up wages for workers or 
marking-down costs for employers - a conclusion supported by the 
evidence of considerable dead weight effects and labour market 
churning associated with such policy interventions. And, once neo-
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become fundamental. 
 
8. The alternative perspective 
 
There is something profoundly pessimistic about the idea that the ills 
of an economic system can be explained largely by the quality and 
motivation of an underclass  comprised of the poorest of the 
population. This is particularly so because this residuum apparently 
disappeared between the 1930s and the 1970s only to reappear in the 
1980s. What can possibly explain this social improvement followed 
so quickly by the social degeneration? The explanation can be found 
not in the phenomenon itself but in how the phenomenon has been 
theorised and portrayed. What is particularly instructive in this respect 
is that Keynes, as he formulated his theory of unemployment, 
progressed from neo-Malthusianism to involuntary joblessness as the 
explanation for poverty (Toye, 1997). The return journey to theories 
of voluntary unemployment and unemployability involves a 
regression to neo-Malthusianism. This U-turn is explained by the 
renewed belief in the efficacy of markets. If it is to be taken to be self 
evident that providing individuals are prepared to accept market 
judgement on their value, labour markets clear, it becomes convenient 
to identify the imperfections of individuals as the reason for non-
market clearing and income inadequacy.  
 
But there is clearly nothing ‘natural’ or inevitable about the allocation 
of income and resources arrived at through the play of market forces. 
There is no such thing as a ‘free’ labour market, and the idea that 
market equilibrium can be restored through deregulation is an 
illusion. The roots of social and economic disadvantage are found not 
in the differing capacities of individuals, but in the way markets work. 
In particular, relationships in the labour market are permeated by 
inequalities of bargaining power, structural barriers to mobility and by 
institutionalised discrimination, which together lead to the systemic 
undervaluation of the labour of disadvantaged groups, the value of 
whose work is not socially recognised. Whether or not there is an 
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theoretically modelled is of little relevance to the formulation of 
policy in a world where the distribution of income and economic 
opportunities is largely determined by power relationships and 
institutional forces.  
 
From this alternative perspective the events of the 1980s and 1990s 
are easily interpreted. The change in policy in the late 1970s shifted 
the balance of power against the weakest in society and intensified 
their exploitation, triggering a downward economic and social spiral. 
Far from becoming welfare dependent by some unspecified social 
process, an increasing number of people have been forced into 
poverty and away from self-sufficiency as a consequence of the 
undermining of the job market and a progressive erosion of 
employment and social rights.  
 
In the neo-classical story, wage subsidies and wage supplements 
benefit society by counteracting labour market imperfections, but they 
increase the imperfections of labour market which are deeply 
segmented. In such labour markets, the freedom afforded to women, 
ethnic minorities, older workers and others who are socially and 
economically disadvantaged and who lack bargaining power is the 
freedom to be discriminated against and to be exploited. As a result, 
they are employed at wages well below their value
8. In effect, these 
labour market imperfections already provide subsidies which keep 
inefficient firms in business, add to the profits and stock market 
valuations of some of the largest firms, keep the prices of consumer 
goods and services down and allow essential public services to be 
supplied on the cheap to the benefit of the tax payer. Wage 
supplements risk adding to this hidden levy and its redistributive 
consequences if, as seems likely, the weak bargaining power of the 
lowest pay fails to prevent the wage top-ups being passed on in lower 
wages and forward into higher profits and lower prices.  
 
The Speenhamland experiment is instructive of the risks involved in 
subsidising wages in segmented labour markets. The Settlement Laws 
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was reinforced by declining employment in arable farming throughout 
South and East. Long distance migration was needed to secure 
alternative work and this was impeded by the risk of loss of relief in 
their parish of settlement and the possibility of their forcible 
repatriation back from the parishes of destination. In the 
industrialising north, Speenhamland had little impact because demand 
for labour pressed hard on supply and, despite the illegality of 
combination, workers were better organised (as they showed later 
when they resisted the workhouse). In these areas, lower levels of 
unemployment and more dynamic labour markets meant higher wages 
and less need for parish relief. In a similar way, until 1815, when the 
Napoleonic War boom finally broke, high demand for labour, even in 
the arable farming areas, prevented the full springing of the 
Speenhamland trap. However, the allowance system had “taken away 
the labourer’s safest guarantee, a living wage, and substituted the 
much weaker one of a minimum family income for paupers” 
(Hobsbawn and Rude, 1993, p.72). After 1815, the pernicious effects 
of subsidising undervalued labour became only too apparent. The 
excess supply of labour drove wages down and the cost of wage 
supplementation and the resulting pressure on the rates led to a cut in 
allowances and the attachment of more humiliating conditions for 
eligibility. 
 
The response to this coincidence of growing social and economic 
degradation and the rising fiscal costs of its increasingly inadequate 
relief, was to hold the victims responsible for their own poverty and to 
use this argument to support policies to cut the cost of social welfare. 
As a consequence, the 1834 Poor Law reforms threw the poor on to 
the mercies of the free labour market, an act which completed the 
emerging class structuring of British society. The social effects of the 
dramatic events of the early 19
th were only slowly ameliorated as the 
political and economic power imbalance in favour of capital was 
gradually redressed by the political and industrial organisation of 
labour and as empirical research and development in social and 
economic thought undermined the theoretical basis of laissez faire. 
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liberal revival and there are important parallels between these events 
and the unfolding of the Speenhamland catastrophe. Since the late 
1970s the labour market has been progressively restructured with an 
increasing polarisation of job opportunities, earnings and wealth. This 
growing divide is widened by the high levels of unemployment, 
economic decline and growing poverty in the old industrial areas and 
inner-cities where the poor are trapped by the multiple disadvantages 
which include the high costs of mobility imposed by regional house 
price disparities and other costs of relocation. Meanwhile, the reforms 
of social welfare away from universal rights towards means testing 
and the greater coercion of the unemployed have progressively 
stripped the poor of their social citizen right, rendered them less 
eligible and caught them in poverty and employment traps. These 
symptoms of increasing market segmentation have been partially 
disguised by periodic economic up-swings which have done nothing 
to address the underlying problems. As a result, poverty and denial of 
economic and social opportunity were more entrenched in the early 
1990s than the 1980s, and there can be no expectation that the next 
recession will have any different effects.  
 
The slippery slope towards Speenhamland has been greased by 
sociological theories of the underclass and economic theories which 
exalt the market and warn against pampering the poor. The immutable 
economic laws and utopian visions of monetarists and free marketeers 
serve to mystify the underlying problems and provide politicians with 
the justification for concentrating the cost of economic crisis on the 
have-nots whilst salving the conscience of the haves by reassuring 
them that although the income distribution is unequal, it is efficient.
 
The twin neo-liberal notion that higher incomes are required to 
motivate the rich whilst lower wages and cuts in out-of-work benefits 
and lower wages are needed to motivate the poor have been used to 
justify a more unequal distribution of income and cuts in taxes on 
high incomes. The adoption of these views as the conventional 
economic wisdom has lifted responsibility for unemployment and 
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poor themselves.  
 
The idea that a more unequal distribution of income is superior on 
efficiency grounds also forms the basis for an opportunistic alliance 
between vote-seeking political parties offering tax cuts and market 
deregulation, and the rent-seeking contented classes, who stand to 
benefit from the tax cuts, the availability of low paid labour and the 
opportunities for profits created by deregulation (Galbraith, 1992). 
Four reinforcing processes have strengthened this alliance. First, the 
victims of the downward economic and social spiral triggered by neo-
liberalism have become increasingly alienated from the ‘democratic’ 
process, so that political exclusion has been added to economic and 
social exclusion. Second, this political exclusion has been 
progressively reinforced as political parties of the Left have 
abandoned their traditional loyalty to the poorest in society and 
embraced the new economic and social orthodoxy to compete for the 
so-called political centre ground. Third, the growing problems of 
long-term unemployment, poverty, crime and social dislocation over 
the past two decades have increasingly polarised society and the 
contented classes have found themselves more and more threatened 
by the dangerous classes. Fourth, those promoting the conventional 
economic wisdom to policy practitioners have continued to justify 
their failed predictions by developing theories explaining 
unemployment, under-employment and poverty in terms of labour 
market imperfections, welfare state dependency and the low quality 
and poor motivation of the unemployed, the under-employed and the 
working poor. By doing so they have raised the possibility of denial 
of social citizenship on the grounds of economic unworthiness and 
provided continued justification for socially and economically 
damaging policies by the age-old expedient of blaming the victim 
(Ryan, 1971).  
 
The apparent failure of the poor to respond to incentives and stimuli 
in the way predicted has led to greater insistence on the need to 
impose on them a duty to work. Experimentation with attaching a 
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encouraging pressure for its extension. But the job creating 
capabilities of these new measures are greatest in the South where 
conditions in the labour markets are now approaching full 
employment, and much less so in the old industrial regions and the 
depressed inner-city areas where unemployment remains high. (Peck, 
2001) It is here where the risks of the Speenhamland effects are 
greatest and where the compulsion to worked sugared by wage 
supplementation are most likely to trigger a downward spiral of pay 
and an upward spiral of the cost of welfare. But these effects are 
likely to become much more widespread as wage supplementation 
programmes are extended and the economy slips into recession.  
 
The risk of the Speenhamland Effect being triggered is greater: (1) the 
more closely social welfare benefits are dependent on labour market 
activity; (2) the weaker is the bargaining power of the recipients of 
social welfare in the labour market and therefore the greater the 
chances are that social welfare will enter into competition and drive 
down wages; and, (3) the higher is the level of unemployment and 
therefore the greater the possibility that workers with subsidised wage 
will be substituted for those without. The answer to (1) lies in the 
design of tax and benefit systems. The answer to (2) lies in providing 
greater protection for workers in low paid labour markets by effective 
trade union representation, legal minimum wages and other form of 
legal protection. The answer to (3) lies in full employment macro-
economic policies. There is no doubt that training has a part to play, 
particularly for workers in need of rehabilitation after years of 
unemployment, harassment by government agencies and make-work 
experimentation. But without a redesign of the tax and benefit 
systems, effective labour standards and full-employment, subsidised 
training is as likely to enter into the competitive process as any other 
form of subsidisation.  
 
If wage supplementation is generalised, if there is the expected 
recession and if the Speenhamland trap is sprung with all its 
disastrous consequences, what then? The workhouse?  
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1   See also Hobsbawn and Rude, 1993, p.76-77 
 
2   Bellers, a Quaker and early advocate of co-operative production, 
argued that an abundance of labour was needed to make wealth 
productive: ‘The labour of the poor being the mines of the rich’ 
(Bellers. 1696, quoted in Polanyi, 1957, p105). Soon after 
Mandeville from a less sympathetic perspective added:  
  ‘All men are more prone to Ease and Plenty than they are to 
Labour, when they are not prompted to it by Pride and Avarice, 
and those that get their Living by their daily labour, are seldom 
powerfully influenced by either: So that they have nothing to stir 
them up to be serviceable but their wants, which it is prudent to 
relieve, but folly to cure. The only thing then that can render the 
labouring man industrious, is a moderate quantity of Money, for 
as too little will, according as his temper is, either dispirit or 
make him desperate, so too much will make him Insolent and 
Lazy’. (Mandeville, 1970, pp. 209-210) 
 
3    For a coherent statement of how these interacted, see Mill, 
(1909), Chapter XII.  
 
4   Described by Mill as: “Sentiments of humanity, joined with the 
idea then inculcated in high quarters, that people ought not to be 
allowed to suffer for having enriched their country with the 
multitude of inhabitants, induced the magistrates of the rural 
districts to commence giving parish relief to persons already in 
private employment” (1909, p.367). 
 
5   Mill went on to argue that providing the poor with allotments to 
grow their own food had an effect analogous to that of 
Speenhamland. Allotments had the beneficial effect of 
increasing production and allowing the poor to improve their 
position by their own effort. But their effects on wages and 
population was precisely the same as Speenhamland: population 
  28increased and wages fell. “The only difference in favour of 
allotments would have been, that they make the people grow 
their own poor rate” (Mill, 1909, p.370). 
 
6   Polanyi argued that: ‘The abolition of Speenhamland was the 
true birthday of the modern working class, whose immediate 
self-interest destined them to become the protectors of society 
against the intrinsic dangers of the machine civilisation. But 
whatever the future held for them, working class and market 
economy appeared in history together. The hatred of public 
relief, the distrust of state action, the insistence of respectability 
and self reliance, remained for generations characteristics of the 
British workers’ (1957, p.101). 
 
7   Bohm-Bawerk, one of the pioneers of the marginal productivity 
theory of wages, said that the Marxist theory of distribution 
constituted ‘the focal point about which attack and defence rally 
in the war in which the issue is the system under which human 
society shall be organised’ (Campus, 1987, p.320). 
 
8    For example, detailed studies show that only 25% of the 
difference between male and female earnings is explained by 
difference in skill, while 75% is accounted for by lower pay for 
the same level of skill. For detailed analysis of the male/female 
wage differentials see Lissenburgh (1995). See also Sachdev 
and Wilkinson, (1998). 
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